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BOOK REVIEW
International Liquidity Issues. By Thomas D. Willett. Washington:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980.
Pp. 114. $5.25
Reviewed by Raymond ]. Waldmann, Esq. *
Casual browsing through Willett's latest study, International
Liquidity Issues, is not for the timid.1 This publication, one of
American Enterprise Institute's series of studies in economic policy,
reviews recent episodes in the evolution of international finance.
Willett's contribution offers first a lucid defense of the managed
floating exchange rate system, which has existed since the 1971
Smithsonian agreements, and, second, some suggestions for modest
improvements in the existing system and the operation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2 While the audience for these
observations may be a small and largely technical one, it is also likely
to be an influential one in light of Willett's experience and wideranging scholarship in this field. 3
*
Assistant Secretary-Designate for International Economic Policy,
Department of Commerce; formerly Of Counsel, Schiff, Hardin & Waite,
Washington, D.C.
T. Willett, International Liquidity Issues (1980) [hereinafter cited
1.
as Willett].
2.
The IMF was formed in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference.
Its principal architects were Lord Keyes of the British Treasury and Dr. Harry
White of the United States Treasury. See E. Goldenweiser & A. Bourneuf, The
Bretton Woods Agreements, Federal Reserve Bulletin, (September, 1944).
Thomas D. Willett, an AEI adjunct scholar and Horton Professor
3.
of Economics at Claremont Graduate School, has served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for International Research.
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The introduction to the study assesses the developments of the
early 1970's, which focused worldwide attention on the connection
between the expansion of international liquidity, the amount of
money in the world economy, and worldwide inflation. 4 Liquidity
expanded rapidly at the time of the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods fixed exchange rate arrangements. 5 The expansion was compounded with the huge increases in oil prices in 1973 and 1974
and the resulting enormous balance of payments surpluses of the
OPEC countries. Willett concludes that these new realities require
substantial rethinking of the issues surrounding international
liquidity.
The second section of the study analyzes the emergence of
current international liquidity concepts. 6 Willett begins by evaluating the degree to which economic concepts rooted in national
monetary behavior can be generalized to explain international
events. He finds the incentives and constraints operating on governments when controlling domestic monetary supply to be significantly different from those controlling their international monetary behavior, and thus of limited applicability. 7 Instead, one
must focus on the unique institutions and incentives of the international system.
The study then describes these unique factors, starting with
the liberal gold standard system that functioned during the latter
part of the nineteenth century until 1913. Nations were committed
to liberal trade policies, fixed exchange rates and the achievement
of long-run equilibrium in the balance of payments through automatic adjustments. Countries running surpluses as well as those
running deficits would be forced to adjust to restore equilibrium.
In practice, of course, the extent, nature and rapidity of adjustment
varied from country to country, situation to situation, but the
theory was adhered to by all major players in the game. 8
4.
Willett, supra note 1,at 1-5.
5.
For a more introductory treatment of this and other international
economic problems, see P. Samuelson, Economics 645-724 (10th ed. 1976).
6.
Willett, supra note 1, at 6-75.
7.
For contrary views on this conclusion see, e.g., the discussions and
references in M. Whitman, Global Monetarism and the Monetary Approach
to the Balance of Payments, 3 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 491-555
(1975).
8.
For a further analysis of the actual operation of the gold standard
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see A. Bloomfield, Monetary
Policy Under The International Gold Standard: 1880-1914 (1959).
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After the First World War and during the interwar period,
domestic macro-economic conditions more heavily influenced
government policies, and the international monetary system became
less automatic in operation. During the great depression of the
1930's each country tried to stimulate domestic employment
through devaluation and protectionist trade policies, regardless of
their international impact. As a result,9world trade was crippled, and
employment was reduced even further.
After World War II, attempts were made to restore the system
by institutionalizing the pressures to make exchange rate adjustments through the IMF, to restore respectability to the gold standard, and to prevent destructive trade practices through the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 10 Exchange rates were not adjusted with as much frequency as expected, however. Official
prestige became associated with maintaining constant exchange rates,
and rigidities prevented the operation of the system as designed. 1 1
Thus the ground was prepared for the
breakdown of the Bretton
12
Woods agreements in the early 1970's.
Willett then analyzes the causes of the liquidity explosion
since the 1970's, and its impact on world inflation.3 Willett argues
persuasively that the explosion of officially held monetary reserves
altered the perception of monetary authorities, the willingness
to adjust, and even ratcheted up the minimum levels of reserves
which governments sought to hold. 1 4 This part of the study, the
most technical and arcane for the general reader, deals extensively
with an interpretation of events and statistics of that period.
Willett next reviews the liquidity implications of the 1973
9.
Willett, supra note 1, at 13.
10. On the establishment of the postwar international monetary system,
see T. Willett, Floating Exchange Rates and International Monetary Reform
(1977) and the references cited therein.
11. See, e.g., J. Murphy, The International Monetary System (1979).
12. Willett attributes this breakdown to the inability of the system
to adjust to the increase in supply-determined international liquidity caused
by the increased size of the United States payments deficit. This was the result
of the efforts by the United States to finance the Vietnam War without an
increase in taxes thereby overburdening the United States economy. Willett,
supra note 1, at 28.
13. Id. at 29-50.
14. For a further discussion of the policy reactions by the major industrial countries to this monetary expansion see L. Laney & T. Willett, The International Liquidity Explosion and Worldwide Monetary Expansion: 19701972. Claremont Working Papers (Claremont Graduate School, (1980)).
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oil shock and succeeding events through the 1970's.15 The accumulations of reserves by the oil exporting countries were substantial,
but not so large as some of the early forecasts. 16 Nevertheless, he
concludes that the ability of the international financial system
to accommodate the shock was probably greater under floating rates
than it would have been under the Bretton Woods fixed exchange
system. Similarly, for many of the same reasons, Willett feels that
the large dollar holdings abroad currently should not be viewed in
isolation as threats to the soundness of the dollar.
His analysis emphasizes the need to look beyond the behavior
of reserve aggregates in order to determine the effects of liquidity
expansion. Reserve aggregates held by governments and their rates
of growth are not, taken alone, appropriate measures of the effectiveness of the system. Thus the problem of international supervision of the adjustment process must be confronted directly, not
just as a reaction to the size of the reserve aggregates.
The third section of the study develops this theme and offers
some specific proposals for policy making. 1 7 Willett argues that
various bureaucratic, political and economic incentives make the
current international monetary arrangements considerably more
stable than many critics have argued. It must be noted in passing
that Willett was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in
the early 1970's and thus is associated with (and perhaps inclined
to defend) the changes he describes. He refers to various models
for organizing the international monetary system, including the
"free for all regime," the automaticity of the gold standard, supranationality with the IMF as a truly international central bank,
hegemony with one country (such as the United States) in control,
and multilateral negotiation. 1 8 He suggests that the most practical
solution would be a combination of judgmental international guidelines coupled with a great deal of passivity on the part of the United
States. 19 This would argue for a large element of "benign neglect"
15.

Willett, supra note 1, at 50-76.

16. See T. Willett, The Oil Transfer Problem and InternationalEconomic
Stability, Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 113 (1975).
17. Willett, supra note 1, at 76-101.
18. Id. at 81-82. These models are from B. Cohen, Organizing the
World's Money: The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations

(1977).
19. For an elaboration on this solution see T. Willett, Floating Exchange
Rates and International Monetary Reform (1977).
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toward the United States balance of payments, a position held by
many associated with the freeing of exchange rates in the 1970's.
Willett rounds out this section with a reasoned argument
that current deviations from a desired economic optimality are
not sufficient to trigger major international monetary reform.
Instead, he argues persuasively for marginal improvements in the
existing system. Such improvements would include allowing the
expansion of the special drawing rights (SDR), tying the expansion of SDRs to a greater ability of the IMF to monitor official
dealings in exchange and money markets, and allowing for substitution facilities at the IMF so that countries accumulating less desirexchange them for
able currencies may, under certain conditions,
20
SDRs or more useful reserve currencies.
In a brief final summary chapter, Willett offers some policyoriented conclusions. 2 1 The first three deal with the incentives
facing national decision makers, the inadequacy of reserve aggregates as a guide to liquidity policies, and the importance of continuing flexible exchange rates combined with surveillance of official borrowing from private financial markets. Willett's fourth
conclusion is that the explosion of liquidity had some effect on
worldwide inflation, but much less than that attributed to it.
His last four points focus on the technical functioning of
the international monetary system and the IMF, recognizing the
fact that countries will not easily sacrifice national sovereignty.
Willett argues that the expansion of the Euro-currency markets
and official borrowing from private institutions have not caused
global inflation or loss of financial discipline. Major international
capital flows reflect the fundamental conditions of particular
countries, and are thus not in themselves bad; they are only the
Finally, the IMF needs resources for
"bearers of bad tidings."
discretionary lending in cases in which substantial official exchange
At bottom, however, stable
market intervention is desirable.
national economic and financial policies and continued strengthening of the basic fabric of international economic cooperation are
more important sources of international monetary stability than
20. Created by the IMF in 1967, Special Drawing Rights are accounting
units, distributed among member-countries of the IMF. They are usable to cover
balance-of-payments deficits. D. Snider, Introduction to International Economics 369-70 (5th ed. 1971).
21.
Willett, supra note 1, at 102-03.
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the IMF or other institutional adjustment mechanisms.
This study is a tightly reasoned and worthwhile analysis of
significant problems not usually addressed in the pages of the business or legal press. It will be instructive for those with the time
and inclination to digest it. The questions addressed are primarily
economic, not legal ones. For those interested in the evolution
of the managed floating rate exchange system and some of the issues
now before the international financial community, the book will
be of value.
It should be clear from this brief and necessarily superficial
review that International Liquidity Issues is not a work for everyone. The intended consumers of Willett's study are presumably
Willett's
government policy makers, negotiators and lawyers.
defense of the exchange rate system and his pleas for modest modifications will provide much grist for their mills. A second audience
will be found among economists, academicians, and those other
writers whose works are so extensively noted in Willett's footnotes
and bibliography. For those audiences, the study contains a great
deal, and will aid in their search for a more stable international
monetary system.

